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Abstract
The advantages of policy and procedural expertise allow revolving door lobbyists to bypass the
costs required of non-revolving door lobbyists. This professional upper hand gives advantages to
the special interest groups that these revolvers represent. In a cross-sectional analysis and
comparative case study of two American states, I find that a state without a mandatory waiting
period for legislators yields a higher number of revolving door lobbyists than a state with a
mandatory waiting period. The findings of this research suggest that lobbying laws are effective
in addressing the saturated influence and involvement of former legislators in the policy making
process.
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Introduction
Democrats have been outspoken in their criticism of the Trump administration’s practice
of appointing lobbyists to advanced and prestigious administrative posts. This practice becomes
more ironic in light of one of the lynchpin promises of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential
election to “drain the swamp” of political elites and insiders in Washington, D.C. Special interest
groups have become increasingly involved in the development of federal and state legislation,
making the professional transitions of legislators increasingly significant. Legislators
approaching the end of their term can choose to remain embroiled in the realm of politics or
pursue other professional opportunities in their local communities. Many legislators choose to
pursue opportunities to engage in legislative advocacy by accepting positions in the private
sector.
The ongoing involvement of individuals who have left office, including those voted out
by their constituents, in the development of public policy raises issues of ethics, transparency,
and symmetry in democratic processes. Data on the frequency of transitions between
employment in the federal legislative sector and employment for a lobbying firm suggests the
concept of a “revolving door” in American politics (Blanes Vidal et. al. 2012). The term
“revolving door”, as it is used here, refers to the process that occurs as legislators transition into
roles as lobbyists; this process is cyclical, meaning that lobbyists also pursue professional
opportunities as legislators. The value of legislative expertise and connections makes revolving
door lobbyists an asset to special interest groups. This process creates implications for
policymaking at the federal and state levels.
The interference of non-elected individuals in the process of policy development presents
a threat to public trust in the legislative process. Relatedly, the continued involvement of former
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legislators whose renewed service was not confirmed through electoral procedures potentially
compromises the legitimacy of the policy making process. Scholars examining the revolving
door have found that revolvers transplant their specialized legislative knowledge and connections
into the private sector through lobbying (Lazarus et al 2016).
Scholars are particularly concerned with the activity of revolving door lobbyists for
several reasons. The expansion of interest group participation in the development of public
policy has intensified competition for the time, attention, and loyalty of legislators at the federal
and state levels (Baumgartner et al 1998). A recent investigation into the hiring practices of a
large energy corporation in Illinois confirmed suspicions that this powerful corporation was
recruiting former legislators with access to political capital in the form of political connections
and specialized expertise (NPR 2019). These hiring practices are made possible by the absence
of clear lobbying laws, and specifically one form of lobbying restriction- a mandatory waiting
period. Lobbying laws are intended to create safeguards against corruption and increase the
culture of political transparency. One of the most widely adopted forms of lobbying oversight are
mandatory waiting period policies. Mandatory waiting periods constitute an attempt to insulate
the legislative process from undue and outside influence. Ranging from six months to six years,
these laws place restrictions on the types of professional opportunities that legislators can pursue
following the completion of their terms (NCSL 2019). According to data from the National
Conference of State Legislatures, 39 states currently have a mandatory waiting period
prohibiting an immediate transition from legislation to legislative advocacy while 11states do not
have a mandatory waiting period by statute (NCSL 2019).
The following thesis seeks to establish the relationship between mandatory waiting
periods and the volume of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin. This thesis
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includes an overview of the existing literature on the features and consequences of the revolving
door. I have also provided an outline of the features of the research design that I used to assess
the impact of one form of restrictive policy on the process of the revolving door in two American
states. I have conducted a comparative case study measuring the impact of the mandatory
waiting period in two states. By picking two states with similarities in relevant political
characteristics, I have identified that states with a mandatory waiting period in place have less
revolving door lobbyists than states without this law. I have identified the methods used to reach
these results. This thesis also includes a discussion of my findings and opportunities for future
research on this topic.
Literature Review
The following literature review includes scholarly commentary on the normative
implications of the revolving door as a political process (Gilens & Page 2014; Lapira & Thomas
2017). Scholars have identified the skills and strategies specific to revolving door lobbyists that
give them a professional upper hand (e.g. Cain & Drutman 2013; Bumgartner et al 1998). There
is developing literature on the phenomenon of the revolving door at the state level (Strickland
2020 A; 2020 B). From this literature, I have identified a gap and corresponding research
question and hypothesis.
One area of focus within the body of literature on the revolving door are the ramifications
of the revolving door for democratic access and equitable representation. Critics of the revolving
door maintain that the consistent and saturated presence of lobbyists can inhibit the access of
constituents to their legislators (Gilens & Page 2014). Some scholars raise objections to the
higher compensation commanded by revolving door lobbyists. Special interest groups that
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cannot offer competitive compensation packages are less likely to be able to recruit talented
revolving door lobbyists. A study by Gilens & Page in 2014 can be used to demonstrate that
business interests maintain an advantage at the expense of constituent advocacy groups. At the
aggregate level, special interest groups and lobbyists represent business entities more frequently
than civic organizations (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Data from the federal level suggests that
revolving door lobbyists represent a greater number of clients and retain these clients at a higher
rate than their colleagues who do not have government experience (Lapira & Thomas 2017).
These trends suggest that corporations with greater resources that can employ revolving door
lobbyists can acquire a greater level of political capital than smaller special interest groups. How
democratic is our legislative process if it only represents the interests of individuals with
legislative experience?
A second focus of the literature on the revolving door is the strategies employed by
revolving door lobbyists that distinguish them from other lobbyists. The strategies employed by
lobbyists have captured the interest of scholars; consequently, the literature on the revolving door
at the federal level largely consists of a discussion of these strategies. There are certain costs
associated with the practice of lobbying, which create substantial hurdles. One major hurdle for
lobbyists and interest groups is the communication of the relevance of their policy issue
(Baumgartner et al 1998). The value of lobbyists in the process of policy development derives
from their ability to mobilize financial resources and legislative information. Financial
contributions and legislative specialization can strengthen the relationship between legislators
and lobbyists. The ability of lobbyists to direct the allocation of financial resources makes them
particularly powerful in the special interest group landscape. These donations to political action
committees yield legislative results, measured by congressional roll call votes (Baumgartner et al
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1998).The desire of lobbyists to obtain the loyalty and commitment of legislators motivates their
willingness to pursue a variety of strategies to develop their relationship with legislators.
Additional characteristics of lobbyists shape the nature of relationships between lobbyists
and legislators. The extent of lobbyists’ network and access to resources on policy issues
increase the likelihood of their success in lobbying for particular interests. Scholars attribute the
advantages experienced by revolving door lobbyists to their professional connections, knowledge
and familiarity with public policy, and intimate understanding of the legislative process (Cain &
Drutman 2013).
Within the body of existing literature on the revolving door, scholars identify and analyze
features of transitions to the private sector at the federal level (Blanes Vidal et al 2012, Gilens &
Page 2014, Cain & Drutman 2013). Scholars have underscored the tactics employed by federal
and state lobbyists to advance the agendas of special interest groups (i.e. tapping into existing
professional connections) (Baumgartner et al 1998, Cain & Drutman 2013). Literature on the
revolving door underscores the advantages and professional upper hand experienced by lobbyists
with legislative experience (Bertrand et al 2014, Berkman 2001, Strickland 2020A, Strickland
2020B).
The expertise and familiarity with which lobbyists and interest groups approach the
development of legislation contributes to their value in the political process. Scholars differ in
their perception of how frequently legislators rely on lobbyists for expertise on policy
development. Information on forthcoming legislation is subject to the scrutiny of lobbyists and
interest groups. Lobbyists with legislative experience often have greater and deeper familiarity
with complex pieces of state and federal legislation (Bertrand et al 2014). The practice of

Head 8
lobbyist messaging requires that lobbyists are particularly knowledgeable about the piece of
legislation for which they are advocating (Heberlig 2005). The length of a given legislator’s
tenure contributes to the extent of their policy expertise (Ozymy 2010). The strength and
eloquence with which lobbyists present a particular legislative initiative determines the trajectory
of a particular concern within the legislative agenda. While lobbyists may acquire knowledge of
a legislator’s preference over the course of their tenure, the practice of lobbying remains a
calculated risk. This association suggests that lobbyists with legislative experience could bolster
their presentation with the additional information and tactics that they acquired through
professional experience in the legislative sphere.
Scholars have distinguished between lobbyists who provide clients with valuable
consultation on political strategy and lobbyists who specialize in providing expertise on pieces of
legislation (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Revolving door lobbyists’ political experiences makes them
qualified to consult on both the technical language inherent in legislation and the strategy
required to introduce and advance policies on behalf of special interest groups.
Revolving door lobbyists are uniquely positioned to experience success in their personal
relationships because their legislative experience affords them knowledge of campaign strategies
and policy expertise. Consequently, revolving door lobbyists can sidestep some of the steps
required to propel the agendas of special interest groups through the legislative process.
Scholars have concluded that revolving door lobbyists can wield their political strength and
experience in particularly competitive and crowded interest group environments (Berkman
2001).
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Within the body of literature on revolving door lobbying, scholars are particularly
concerned with the tactics employed by lobbyists to advance policies favoring particular special
interests. The application of interpersonal tactics characterizes the behavior of individual
lobbyists. Interest groups tend to develop strategies based on their acquisition of revolving door
lobbyists while revolving door lobbyists leverage tactics. Personal meetings continue to be the
most frequent vehicle through which lobbyists interact with legislators (Nownes & DeAlejandro
2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Scholars insist that, of the advantages experienced by revolving
door lobbyists, personal connections remain the most valuable link in relationships between
lobbyists and legislators. Personal meetings provide lobbyists with the most direct vehicle for
advocacy (Nownes & DeAlejandro 2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Logic suggests that revolving
door lobbyists who maintain connections to practicing legislators would have an upper hand over
their colleagues with limited professional networks. These revolving door lobbyists would be
more likely to leverage their political connections to schedule personal meetings with current
legislators. Their personal connections are contingent on the ongoing service of their legislative
colleagues. These personal connections create political leverage, making former legislators
particularly valuable capital for lobbying firms.
Studies conducted on the dynamic relationship between lobbyists and legislators
demonstrate the parallels in personal and professional recruitment experienced by lobbyists and
legislators (Zeigler & Baer 1968). Similar professional experiences create solidarity and
strengthen personal relationships between lobbyists and legislators.
The common objective of reelection drives legislators to prioritize consistent support
from voters on legislative decisions (Denzau & Munger 1986). The commitment of legislators to
maintaining voter support restricts the introduction and discussion of potential legislative
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initiatives within conversations between legislators and lobbyists. Lobbyists are limited by the
reelection objectives of legislators; they are unlikely to present initiatives that interfere with a
legislator’s ability to acquire voter support for successive terms in office. The ability to pursue
pieces of legislation without concern for constituent feedback can be an attractive incentive for
legislators to transition into the private sector.
In his examination of the composition of state legislatures, Todd Maske discovered that
specialization and expertise play a significant role in the successful development and evolution
of legislation (Maske 2019). Specialization and expertise are particularly valuable in the context
of legislative committees. Lobbyists with experience on specific legislative committees have
tools to effectively introduce and advocate a legislative agenda in their meetings with members
of that committee. The literature evaluating the extent of the revolving door at the federal level
has identified several significant strategies. Scholars have observed similar trends at the state
level, with significant discrepancies in the extent to which revolving door activity is regulated.
Continuity and Change: Variation in Lobbying Regulation across US States
The literature on the revolving door is largely focused on Congressional transitions to
large scale lobbying firms in Washington, DC. The dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at
the state level mirrors the dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at the federal level.
Established groups with extensive resources experience an advantage over smaller, grassroots
organizations (Browne 1985). My work builds on James Strickland’s recent research (2020 A,
2020 B) on the impact of lobbying regulations on special interest group activity. Strickland
identified and evaluated trends in the number of revolving door lobbyists in American states
across a period of about 30 years.
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The work of some scholars in the body of literature on the revolving door addresses the
dynamic between legislators and lobbyists in state legislatures. The literature on the revolving
door at the state level delineates the variation across lobbying regulations (Brinig 1993,
Strickland 2020A). Specifically, there is variation in the existence and implementation of
mandatory waiting periods for legislators attempting to transition into the private sector upon
completing their legislative term (NCSL 2019). This variation potentially creates windows for
special interest groups to exploit. Over the past thirty years, all fifty states have experienced an
increase in the number of lobbyists employed by special interest groups (Strickland 2020A). The
stringency and extent of lobbying regulation varies significantly across the fifty states (Brinig
1993). The basic standard of regulation consists of a registration requirement and a threshold for
financial transparency (Ozymy 2013). Within the scope of lobbying regulations, states differ in
their classification of lobbying and the limitations that they place on lobbyist activity outside of
the legislature. States also differ on disclosure requirements for lobbyists.
Scholars have hypothesized that as regulations increase, the likelihood of favorable
legislative outcomes for lobbyists decreases (Brinig 1993). One common lobbying regulation is a
mandatory waiting period, sometimes referred to as a cooling off period, requiring legislators to
wait for a set number of months prior to accepting a position with a lobbying firm and registering
as a lobbyist. Scholars underscore that regulations increase the cost of lobbying. Data from
studies on state-level lobbying regulation suggests that the stringency and extent of lobbying
regulations can deter the registration of lobbyists and interest groups (Gray & Lowery 1998).
The body of literature on the revolving door largely consists of analysis on the
recruitment and acquisition of former legislators by interest groups. Research on the revolving
door at the federal level indicates that lobbyists with legislative experience are particularly
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attractive to lobbying firms. Legislators’ professional connections and expertise on policy and
procedure make them particularly attractive candidates for recruitment to lobbying firms.
Evidence collected from previous studies confirms the existence of a relationship between
regulations on interest group representatives and the extent of interest group influence in state
legislatures (Ozymy 2010). The implementation of mandatory waiting periods as a response to
the growing influence of the revolving door creates consequences for the development and
outcomes of public policy. Lobbyists with legislative experience solicit higher rates of
compensation at the federal and state levels. Mandatory waiting periods constitute a barrier to a
direct transition from legislation to lobbying in the private sector. I hypothesize that the existence
of a mandatory waiting period will reduce the number of revolving door lobbyists in a state.
Relatedly, I hypothesize that the absence of a mandatory waiting period will yield a greater
number of revolving door lobbyists in a state.
Methods
To analyze the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the volume of revolving door
lobbyists, I will be implementing John Stuart Mill’s method of comparison. I will be
implementing Mill’s method of difference, a process through which I will identify two states that
share similar characteristics among most of the theoretically-relevant explanations but differ in
my primary area of examination. If these two states have different levels of revolving door
lobbyists, I can attribute this to the one policy characteristic where these states differ.
To measure my primary independent variable, I rely upon the National Conference of
State Legislature’s data on revolving door prohibitions in each of the fifty states to determine
which states currently enforce a mandatory waiting period prohibiting legislators from pursuing a
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position with a lobbying firm within a defined number of months following the end of their term.
I will not be assessing the stringency of mandatory waiting periods, but rather the existence of a
mandatory waiting period. So I need two states- one with a mandatory waiting period and one
without this statute in place. To ensure that the mandatory waiting period is driving changes in
the number of revolving door lobbyists, I need to exclude the possibility of other variables
shaping these results.
To ensure that it is the presence of a mandatory waiting period that shapes the number of
revolving door lobbyists, I also need to identify several other variables that might account for the
variation in volume of legislators transitioning into the private sector. Moreover, I need to ensure
that the two states have similar characteristics on these variables to ensure that differences in
mandatory waiting periods account for differences in the number of revolving door lobbyists.
The first variable I considered is the existence of legislative term limits. Literature on term limits
in state legislatures suggests that these limits shape the strength and efficiency of policy making.
The absence of term limits allows legislators to continue to acquire expertise of legislation and
familiarity with legislative procedure (Ozymy 2010). In their survey of lobbyists, Gary Moncrief
and Joel Thompson (2001) observed that most lobbyists perceive term limits as a catalyst for
changing the structure of policy making for both the executive and legislative branches
(Moncrief & Thompson 2001). Term limits accelerate the process of legislative turnover which
can result in a political climate that is rapidly changing in its partisan orientation. Term limits
also impact the likelihood that legislators will pursue different legislative offices (Lazarus 2006).
Term limits could catalyze legislators’ transition into the private sector. Therefore, I hypothesize
that states with term limits will have greater numbers of revolving door lobbyists while states
without term limits will have lesser numbers of revolving door lobbyists.
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A second variable that I analyzed is the existence of campaign contribution limits.
Campaign contributions constitute an important form of special interest group participation in
state politics. Financial contributions can enhance or reinforce lobbying efforts. Campaign
contributions are often contingent on a legislator’s commitment to a particular legislative
outcome (Powell 2012). The implementation of contribution limits on state legislative campaigns
constitute one form of addressing the influence of prominent donors on the legislative process.
Some scholars suggest that it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between campaign
contributions and political outcomes. Studying these contributions in tandem with an analysis of
lobbying efforts can more fully contextualize and explain legislative outcomes. What matters
here is that there are contribution limits-the literature has identified that campaign contributions
play a role in shaping outcomes, so I took this variable into consideration when selecting my
states, but I will be looking at whether or not a contribution limit exists- the size of the limit is
not relevant to the findings of this study .
Recent literature underscores the relationship between state policies on campaign
financing and the culture of lobbying and interest groups. Campaign contribution regulations
tend to be more stringent than regulations of lobbying practices (Briffault 2008). James
Strickland observed that campaign finance regulations adversely impact the registration of
lobbyists (Strickland 2019b). I hypothesize that the existence of campaign contribution limits
could deter the registration of lobbyists, thereby decreasing the total number of registered
lobbyists in a given state. This would consequently reduce the number of revolving door
lobbyists by extension.
A third variable that I researched is the size of a state’s legislature. I hypothesize that a
larger state legislature would produce a higher number of registered lobbyists. The logic here
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interest groups will need to employ more lobbyists to meet the needs of more legislators. A state
legislature with a greater number of legislators will produce a larger pool of individuals who
might be interested in transitioning into positions in the private sector. Data on state legislative
trends suggests that as the size of state legislatures increases, they become more
professionalized. (Malhotra 2006).
An additional variable that I will include in my consideration of states for analysis is the
professionalism of state legislatures. The term “professionalism” in this context encompasses the
extent of professional resources available to state legislators. The term also refers to the
seriousness and expertise with which political actors approach the state legislative process
(Mooney 1995). Within the body of literature on state legislatures, scholars underscore the
growing trend of professionalization across state legislatures (Mooney 1995). Professional
legislatures tend to consist of legislators with specialized knowledge and expertise. The process
of professionalization encourages legislators to match their expertise to the growing demands of
the public sector (Malhotra 2006). I anticipate that the characteristics of professional legislatures
produce several dynamics. Some scholars maintain that the professionalization of legislatures has
lengthened the career terms of legislators, potentially curbing transitions into the private sector
(Woods & Baranowski 2006). The demand for specialization and expertise in the lobbying
industry suggests that professional legislators would be highly valuable capital for lobbying
firms. Some scholars observe that the professionalization of legislatures complicates interest
group influence (Berkman 2001). Legislators become increasingly knowledgeable of policy
developments in professional legislatures and typically build stronger connections with their
constituents (Berkman 2001). The systematic and streamlined characteristics of professional
legislatures make legislators less reliant on outside information (Berkman 2001). Because there
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is a demand from lobbying firms for specialized legislative expertise, I predict that professional
legislatures will produce more revolving door lobbyists.
There is a natural relationship between the professionalization of a state legislature and
compensation for legislators (Fiorina 1999). I anticipate that legislatures with higher salaries
could yield fewer revolving door lobbyists than state legislatures with lower salaries.
Compensation shapes the likelihood that legislators will accept non-monetary benefits from
lobbyists (Ozymy 2010).
Using Mill’s method, I compared a number of variables across all fifty states. I
determined that Illinois and Wisconsin are most compatible in several areas of political activity.
As demonstrated in Table A, neither Illinois nor Wisconsin has legislative term limits. In both
states, Senators serve in four-year terms while representatives serve in two-year terms. Both
states place limits on contributions to legislative campaigns. Illinois and Wisconsin have
comparably sized legislative chambers. Both the Illinois legislature and the Wisconsin legislature
are full-time, professional legislatures. The salaries for legislators in Illinois and Wisconsin are
relatively similar. Significantly, Illinois and Wisconsin differ on the policy of mandatory waiting
periods for legislators attempting to enter the private sector. Wisconsin has a twelve-month
mandatory waiting period for legislators transitioning into the private sector while Illinois does
not have a mandatory waiting period (NCSL 2019). I have accounted for other variables that
could explain the variation in volume of revolving door lobbyists, allowing me to trace the
discrepancies to the differing policies on waiting periods.
For the purposes of this research, I identified the number of revolving door lobbyists as
my dependent variable. Measuring the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience
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(“revolvers”) in Illinois and Wisconsin provides a quantitative indication of the extent to which
former legislators are serving as lobbyists in their respective states. I recognize that there may be
former legislators working for special interest groups in an unofficial capacity. This thesis does
not attempt to capture the entirety of former legislators’ involvement with special interest groups
but rather seeks to identify the relationship between one particular policy by statute and the
volume of revolving door lobbyists.
To measure the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the lobbyist population, I
conducted a cross sectional study of lobbyists registered in Illinois and Wisconsin in 2017. I used
lobbyist databases to create two lists of registered lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin using data
from the National Institute on Money in Politics, an organization that compiles data on a variety
of political practices, including relationships between lobbyists and clients. I used data from the
Wisconsin Elections Commission and Illinois State Board of Elections compiled to compile lists
of data on biennial election results in both Illinois and Wisconsin for the years 1998-2014. The
literature on the revolving door motivated my selection of data for these years. Scholars suggest
that revolving door lobbyists employ their most salient political connections formed with
contemporary legislative colleagues as they advocate for special interest groups (Bertrand et al
2014, Ainsworth 1997).
I compared the list of registered lobbyists to the election results in both Illinois and
Wisconsin to determine the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience. For each
state, I compiled a list of the lobbyists with legislative experience and subsequently calculated
the number of revolving door lobbyists as a proportion of the overall number of lobbyists. I only
considered individual entries and sorted the registered lobbyist lists by lobbyists and lobbying
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firms. I looked at each entry on the list of registered lobbyists from 2017 to determine whether
there was a match with the legislator data from 1998-2014.
In summary, using a comparative case study- I have selected Illinois and Wisconsin- two
states that differ in the presence of mandatory waiting periods but that display similarities on all
other theoretically relevant variables. I anticipate that the absence of a mandatory waiting period
will result in more revolving door lobbyists in Illinois than in Wisconsin.
Discussion of Results
From the data I examined, I determined that in the state of Illinois there were 41 former
legislators registered to lobby in 2017. I determined that in the state of Wisconsin there were 13
former legislators registered to lobby in 2017. Of the 377 legislators who served in the Illinois
state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 10.6% transitioned into positions as lobbyists. Of the
281 legislators who served in the Wisconsin state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 4.6%
transitioned into positions as lobbyists. This data reveals a significant discrepancy in the volume
of revolving door lobbyists in a state with a statute restricting transitions to lobbying and a state
without such a statute.
The chamber breakdown of the revolving door lobbyists signals important trends in the
nature of the revolving door. 31 of the 41 (76%) revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois
House of Representatives while 10 (24%) of the revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois
Senate. 10 of the 13 (77%) revolvers served in the Wisconsin House of Representatives with 3 of
the 13 (23%) revolvers serving in the Wisconsin Senate. This data is consistent with the
respective sizes of the House of Representatives and Senate in each state. There are more
members in the Illinois and Wisconsin Houses of Representatives than in the Senates.
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Furthermore, the length of the term in the House of Representatives is two years while the length
of the term in the Senate is four years. The volume of legislators serving in the House of
Representatives, coupled with the length of the term in the House explains the greater number of
revolvers transitioning out of the House of Representatives.
Using 2017 data, 26 of the 41 (63%) registered lobbyists with legislative experience in
Illinois were Democrats while 15 of the 41 (37%) lobbyists with legislative experience were
Republicans (See Figure A). The partisan composition of the population of revolving door
lobbyists looked quite different in Wisconsin. 2 of the 13 (15%) registered lobbyists with
legislative experience in Wisconsin were Democrats while 11 of the 13 (85%) lobbyists with
legislative experience were Republican. The partisan breakdown of these groups of revolvers
likely reflects the partisan landscapes of Illinois and Wisconsin. Recent electoral results suggest
that Wisconsin is a Republican state while Illinois is a Democratic state. These results signal that
being a former member of the majority party in the state legislature increases the likelihood of
transitioning to the private sector. The literature on the revolving door maintains that these
revolvers have intimate knowledge of the types of legislation that will pass through the
respective state legislatures.
Some anecdotal examples of political actions taken by revolving door lobbyists help
demonstrate the consequences of revolving door transitions in Illinois. Not all revolvers are
pushing for the agendas of a select group of corporations. For example, John Bradley, a former
Democratic member of the Illinois House of Representatives, lobbies on behalf of a Chicago
Theater group. Relevant to the purposes of this research, however, is the fact that Bradley
registered to lobby the day after the swearing in of his successor. Some other former legislators
leverage their expertise and relationships to benefit larger corporations.
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The following examples relate to one corporation in Illinois that has been particularly
successful in recruiting legislators to serve as lobbyists. Denny Jacobs held a seat in the Illinois
Senate until his son Mike took over the seat. Denny began a career as a lobbyist shortly after
exiting public office; one of his clients was Commonwealth Edison, or ComEd, the largest
electric company in Illinois (Timmons 2015). During his time in office, Mike served on the
Illinois Senate’s energy committee creating a point of intersection between his legislative service
and his father’s lobbying career (Timmons 2015).
Additional evidence suggests that recruiting legislators with familiarity with relevant
committees and key legislators is important for utility companies like ComEd. ComEd
successfully recruited Anazzette Collins, former chair of the House Public Utilities Committee.
Collins’ familiarity with developing energy legislation coupled with her connections to
individuals serving on the Utilities Committee and related committees likely made her an
attractive candidate for a lobbying position with ComEd.
Dave Sullivan, a former Republican Senator accepted a lobbying position at the end of
his time in office and his clients include large corporations like AT & T and AbbVie. Given the
evidence in the literature on the use of compensation as a recruiting tool, large corporations with
greater access are able to pay legislators for their expertise and relationships. The preceding
examples confirm the fears of scholars who have cautioned against the saturation of interest
group lobbyists with legislative and procedural expertise.
Between 1989 and 2011, the number of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois increased
from 32 to 38. Within that same span of twenty-two years, the number of revolving door
lobbyists in Wisconsin decreased from 18 to 11 (Strickland 2020B). These trends are consistent
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with my findings that the absence of a mandatory waiting period increases a state’s volume of
revolving door lobbyists. Relatedly, this research suggests that the use of a mandatory waiting
period serves as an effective deterrent of an immediate transition from legislation to lobbying.
The decreased number of revolving door lobbyists in a state like Wisconsin with a policy directly
addressing the influence of lobbyists with legislative experience indicates that this policy
contributes to the political culture surrounding the revolving door. The quantitative data and
anecdotal examples suggest that interest groups in Illinois are incorporating former legislators
into the fold of lobbying and advocacy. Large corporations are able to employ several former
legislators at a time, giving them a substantial resource advantage over smaller interest groups.
If given the opportunity to research this topic further in the future, I would be interested
in coding the stringency of mandatory waiting periods to determine whether longer and more
restrictive mandatory waiting periods decrease the number of revolving door lobbyists in a given
state. I would like to expand this research to include more states. In doing so, I could generalize
these findings and further measure the effectiveness of mandatory waiting periods. I anticipate
that effective policies developing at the state level could inform the development of additional
policies related to the revolving door at the federal level. The issue of “shadow interests” in local
and national interests is growing in relevance in the sphere of political science literature and I
hope to contribute to this expanding sector of study.
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Tables & Figures
Table A: Legislature Characteristics, Illinois and Wisconsin
Variable

Illinois

Wisconsin

Legislative Term Limits

No

No

Term Length

Senate: 4 years, Assembly: 2
years

Senate: 4 years, House: 2
years

Campaign Contribution
Limits

Yes

Yes

Legislature Size

59 Senate, 118 House

33 Senate, 99 Assembly

Legislative
Professionalism

Professional Legislature

Professional Legislature

Full-Time/Part-Time
Legislature

Full-Time

Salary

$67,836/year

$50,950/year

Mandatory Waiting Period
by Statute

No

Yes

Sources: Ballotpedia, NCSL

Full-Time

Head 23

Figure A: Illinois: Revolving
Door Lobbyists' Partisanship
Democrats

Republicans

37%

63%

Figure B: Illinois: Revolving
Door Lobbyists'
Congressional Chamber
Senate

House

23%

77%
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Figure C: Wisconsin:
Revolving Door Lobbyists'
Partisanship
Democrats

Republicans
15%

85%

Figure D: Wisconsin:
Revolving Door
Lobbyists' Congressional
Chamber
Senate

House
23%

77%
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